Politics Section Special Reports

In Campaign Finance, One Party's `Level Playing Field' Is Another's Shaky Ground By Helen Dewar and Guy Gugliotta Washington Post Staff Writers Monday, April 7 1997; Page A06 Democrats want to limit election spending in order to "level the playing field," as they put it in their best civics-book style. Never mind that it would also erase the fund-raising advantage the Republicans have used to capture and keep control of Congress. Republicans can play the same game. They insist that any campaign finance bill require labor unions to get written permission from members before dues could be used for political purposes. They call this the "Paycheck Protection Act." Never mind that union money nearly always goes to Democrats. Behind the lofty debate over reform of campaign finance laws, which is resuming on Capitol Hill, is an elbows-to-ribs fight for partisan advantage that has contributed greatly to the defeat of reform efforts for two decades. While lawmakers worry first about preserving their advantages as incumbents, their next thought is to stack the deck for their party. For years, Republican filibusters or vetoes smothered any Democratic-drafted bills that were not scuttled by bipartisan foot-dragging on the part of incumbents. "Partisan tilting of the scales is at the heart of the deadlock," said University of Virginia political science professor Larry J. Sabato, who served on a panel of experts who came up with a bipartisan plan in 1990, only to see it die in a partisan cross-fire in the Senate. Hoping to avoid the same fate, sponsors of a new bipartisan effort, including Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) and Reps. Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) and Martin T. Meehan (D-Mass.), have tried to balance the prospective gains and losses for each party. For instance, Democrats would get voluntary spending limits, with free television time and other benefits offered as incentives in exchange for what McCain calls "reasonable" constraints on union activities. Democrats, many of whom tap into Hollywood and New York to make up for their inability to raise funds at home, would have to accept some constraints on out-of-state fund-raising. Republicans, who raise more than Democrats in unregulated "soft money" contributions to political parties, would have to agree to turn off that spigot. But many lawmakers remain reluctant to give up any perceived advantages, even after the Democrats took the White House and Republicans took Congress, reversing the traditional flow pattern of campaign money. Political action committees that once gave mainly to Democratic incumbents now give to GOP incumbents, and both parties know the current could change again at any time. Here are the partisan stakes in the current debate on campaign finance: Spending limits: Democrats tend to favor overall limits, while Republicans oppose them, saying they need extra money to compete in weak-GOP states where organized labor and "the liberal media" are strong. Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) spent $4.6 million to win reelection in 1996, eclipsing Democratic opponent Steven Beshear's $1.7 million in a state where voter registration is 65 percent Democratic. "If you level the playing field financially for somebody like me," McConnell asks, "in what way have you created a competitive situation?" The McCain-Feingold and Shays-Meehan bills set voluntary spending limits of $1.5 million to $8.25 million for Senate races, depending on the size of the state, and $600,000 for the House. Individual contributions: Republicans would like to raise the $2,000 limit, while Democrats, fearing GOP fund-raising strength among the rich, want to keep it low. In fact, analysis by the nonpartisan Center for Responsive Politics shows Democrats doing just as well as Republicans among "large" individual contributors ($200 or greater). But Republicans, skillful in soliciting through direct mail, have a large advantage in "small" contributions under $200. In 1994, the latest year for which full statistics are available, House Republicans got 36 percent of their funds from large contributors, and 25 percent from small contributors. Democrats had 31 percent large contributions, but only 14 percent small. The proposed bills leave existing limits intact, although sponsors have indicated the provision is negotiable. Political action committees: Democrats generally like PACs more than Republicans, in part because labor PACs overwhelmingly support Democrats (95 percent in 1994, according to the Center for Responsive Politics). But PAC giving is dominated by corporate groups, which spent $139.7 million in 1995-96 to labor's $45 million, and corporate money moves toward whomever wields power. In 1996, with the GOP atop Congress, Federal Election Commission data showed the country's 10 largest corporate PACs favored Republicans over Democrats $5.8 million to $2.5 million. In 1992, with Democrats dominant, the same PACs favored Democrats $3.8 million to $2.8 million. The proposed legislation would ban or severely restrict PAC contributions. Soft money: Democrats would like to get rid of it, because "Republicans raise significantly more of it," McCain said. The edge was significant in 1996 ($150 million to $117 million, according to the nonpartisan group Public Citizen). Far more dramatic was the increase in soft money contributions to both parties in 1996 over 1992, when the GOP raised $46.2 million and the Democrats $32.9 million. The proposed bills would ban soft money. Out-of-state contributions: Democrats believe out-of-state money is a must for them to compete in sparsely populated states and congressional districts where most of the available money is Republican. Democrats always "have to worry about whether their party can make its maximum contribution" in one of these races, Sabato said. "Republicans can always do so." A Public Citizen analysis suggests the conventional wisdom is true, at least in the Senate, where seven of the top 10 incumbent recipients of out-of-state contributions in 1994 were small-state Democrats. But another preliminary analysis by Public Citizen showed Republicans in many small-state 1996 races were just as dependent on out-of-state contributions. In South Dakota, winning Senate challenger Tim Johnson (D) raised only 11 percent of his large individual contributions from inside the state, but losing Sen. Larry Pressler (R) raised even less (7 percent). The proposed bills envision that candidates would raise 60 percent of individual contributions within their states. Rich candidates: Republicans seem to fear rich opponents more than Democrats, but the available evidence cuts both ways. Congress's best-known recent example of deep pockets was then-Rep. Michael Huffington (R-Calif.), who spent $30 million of his own in an unsuccessful Senate race against incumbent Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) in 1994. There is little doubt that cash-short Democrats are always looking for self-financing candidates. In 1996 Senate races, rich Democratic challengers faltered in Idaho, Oregon, South Carolina and Virginia. "They didn't do very well, but they sure scared . . . a lot of Republicans," McCain said. Under the legislation, candidates must agree to limit spending of their own money in order to receive other benefits. If they refuse, their opponent's overall spending limit would be raised. Public financing: Democrats have long supported it, but Republicans have condemned it as a government intrusion and "welfare for politicians." It is not included in the legislation. © Copyright 1997 The Washington Post Company Back to the top Go to Campaign Finance Report | Go to Politics Section